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CASENOTE: Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc.,_ U.S._, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
CLEAN WATER ACT CITIZEN SUITS AFTER
GWALTNEY: Applying Mootness Principles in Private
Enforcement Actions
REED

D. BENSON*

The Supreme Court recently held that a citizen plaintiff must make
a good-faith allegation of an ongoing violation in order to bring an
enforcement action under the Clean Water Act. The decision in
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 1
will prevent citizens from bringing suit for the assessment of civil penalties solely for past violations of the Clean Water Act.
Gwaltney undoubtedly will provoke a burst of litigation as to the
imposition of penalties for Clean Water Act violations. A brief discussion of mootness appears near the end of the Court's opinion in
Gwaltney. This mootness language, when read in conjunction with
other portions of the opinion, raises questions about the ability of citizen plaintiffs to maintain enforcement suits for the assessment of civil
penalties where the violations cease before final judgment. The way in
which courts interpret Gwaltney and apply mootness principles in citizen suits will have a major impact on private enforcement of the
Clean Water Act.
This note gives an overview of private enforcement and the statutory role of citizens in vindicating public rights under the Clean Water
Act. Further, this note analyzes the possible effects of the Supreme
Court's holding in Gwaltney and its potential impact on the way
courts examine and apply mootness principles to citizen suits.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF CITIZEN

Suns UNDER THE

CLEAN

w ATER ACT

Congress gave the federal government a dominant role in controlling water pollution when it enacted the Federal Water Pollution Con-

* B.S. 1985, Iowa State University; J.D. 1988, University of Michigan. The author wrote
this note while working as an intern at the U.S. Department of Justice, Land and Natural Resources Division. The views presented are solely those of the author and do not present the views
of the Justice Department.
I. 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
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trol Act Amendments of 1972, 2 better known as the Clean Water Act
(also referred to as the Act). 3 The Clean Water Act defines ambitious
national goals for water quality4 and outlines a technology-based approach to achieving them. 5 It establishes a comprehensive federal system of regulation, with the national and. state governments sharing
responsibility. 6 The Clean Water Act also features a multifaceted enforcement scheme in which the Environmental Protection Agency (the
EPA), states, and private citizens are authorized to take a variety of
actions to enforce its provisions. 7

A.

The Statutory Enforcement Scheme

The Act contains "unusually elaborate enforcement provisions,
conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on government officials and private citizens. " 8 However, Congress did not grant equal
authority to all parties, and the courts have struggled to define the
role of private citizens in an enforcement scheme where the federal
and state governments have the pre-eminent role.

1.

The Government Role

The EPA and the states are the principal enforcers of the Clean
Water Act. 9 In states which have federally approved National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting programs, 10
the state has the primary responsibility to bring enforcement actions
for NPDES violations; the EPA may sue if the state does not act. 11
The EPA also has authority to bring enforcement actions for violations of federal permits and other unlawful conduct, and to issue

2. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816, 888 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1376 (1982)).
3. Federal water pollution control legislation originated with the Refuse Act of 1899, 33
U.S.C. § 407 (1982). The roots of the Clean Water Act extend back to 1948; however, the 1972
law forms the basis of the modern statute. See The Clean Water Act Amendments of 1987, 18
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 19, pt. 2, at 2-3 (Sept. 4, 1987) (reprinted separately).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1311-1345 (1982).
6. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987).
7. 33 u.s.c. §§ 1319, 1365 (1982).
8. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13
(1981).
9. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620,
625 (D. Md. 1987); Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 383.
10. Under the NPDES program, a pollution source receives a permit from a state (or from
the EPA, if the state has no federally approved NPDES program of its own) to discharge pollution, subject to certain conditions and limitations. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
11. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), 1319(a) (1982). See also United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F.
Supp. 734, 740 (D. Del. 1981).
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compliance orders for any violation. 12 Sanctions include administrative, civil, and criminal penalties. 13
The federal-state relationship established by the Clean Water Act is
both legallyJ 4 and politically complex. As one federal court has stated,
''the tensions inherent in a federal system are recreated, if not exacerbated, by the Act, which ofttimes fails to create clear boundaries for
the respective authorities of the federal government, the states and the
people." 15 Essentially, the EPA's job is to ensure that the states enforce the Act; thus, the EPA must delegate primary enforcement responsibility to the states while maintaining oversight and providing
guidance and support. The EPA's experience with the Act illustrates
the difficulty, and the importance, of striking the appropriate balance.16 The matter is further complicated by the presence of a third
group, private citizens, which has power to enforce the Clean Water
ActY

2.

The Private Role

The Clean Water Act authorizes a "broad category" of citizens to
bring enforcement actions as private attorneys general.1 8 However, the
courts have uniformly viewed citizens as secondary enforcers of the
Act, with the primary enforcement responsibility vested in the EPA
and the states.1 9
Section 505 of the Clean Water Act authorizes any citizen to file
suit against any person alleged to be in violation of certain portions of
the Act. 20 Violation of an order issued under the Clean Water Act by
the EPA or a state also provides cause for a private citizen suit. 21 Citizens also may sue the Administrator of the EPA for failing to perform a nondiscretionary duty under the Act. 22 The Act defines

12. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1982).
13. 33 u.s.c. §§ 1319, 1342(b)(7) (1982).
14. See, e.g., Cargill, 508 F. Supp. at 739-40.
15. Id. at 736.
16. See Stanfield, Ruckelshaus Casts EPA as "Gorilla" in States' Enforcement Closet,
NAT'l J ., May 26, 1984, at 1034-38.
17. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. l, 16-17 (1981).
19. See Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 383; Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620, 625 (D. Md. 1987).
20. 33 U .S.C. § l 365(a)(l) (1982).
21. Id.
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982).
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"citizen" as "a person or persons having an interest which is or may
be adversely affected. " 23
Section 505 gives citizens basic power to enforce the Clean Water
Act, but it also places limits and conditions on their authority to sue.
First, some portions of the Act are not enforceable by citizens:
Reduced to a nutshell, citizens may enforce against discharges which
lack required Clean Water Act §§402 [NPDESJ or 404 [dredge and
fill] permits; violations of ... [those] permits; and violations of new
source, toxic pollutant, and pretreatment standards. They may not
enforce against violations of information request, recordkeeping,
reporting, or entry requirements (except insofar as they happen to be
permit violations); Clean Water Act §311 oil or hazardous material
spill requirements and prohibitions; Clean Water Act §312 marine
sanitation device requirements; or Clean Water Act §405 sludge
disposal and permit requirements. 24

Second, a prospective citizen plaintiff must give notice of a violation
to the EPA, to the state in which the alleged violation occurs, and to
the alleged violator at least 60 days prior to filing suit. 25 Third, section
505 forbids citizen suits if the EPA or a state ''has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the
United States, or a State to require compliance." 26 However, the Act
allows citizens to intervene as a matter of right.27 Fourth, the Supreme
Court has recently held that citizen plaintiffs must make a good-faith
allegation of an ongoing violation to bring suit under section 505. 28
Thus, unlike government officials, citizens may not sue purely for
past violations of the Clean Water Act. 29
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1982). Congress chose this language so that citizen suit plaintiffs
could meet the test of standing announced by the Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972). Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
l, 16 (1981).
24. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, (pt. 1), 13 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10309, 10320-21 (1983) (citation omitted).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(A) (1982). Some courts have held that the 60-day notice requirement is jurisdictional; others have allowed citizen suits to proceed despite plaintiffs' failure to
comply strictly with the Clean Water Act's notice provisions. See Annotation, Citizen's Action
Under 33 U.S.C.S. § 1365(a)(l) for Violation of Effluent Standards or Limitations Under Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251 et seq.) or Orders with Respect Thereto,
68 A.L.R. FEo. 701, 708-12 (1984).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(B) (1982). Courts have struggled with this provision, both as to
the types of government proceedings it covers and as to the meaning of "diligently prosecuting."
See Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 23, 4450 (1985); Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, (pt. 2), 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10063, 10067-71 (1984).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (b)(l)(B) (1982).
28. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 385.
29. Id.
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Citizen plaintiffs who clear the preliminary statutory hurdles generally fare well under section 505. Plaintiffs typically rely on discharge
monitoring reports (DMRs) to prove that a permit violation has occurred. DMRs are the records of pollution discharged by the NPDES
permittees, as detected by required effluent tests conducted by the dischargers.30 These reports must be made available to the public. 31 A
plaintiff may prove that a discharger violated the Act simply by showing that the discharger's DMRs show that effluents of pollution exceeded permitted levels. 32 Courts have frequently granted summary
judgment to plaintiffs on the strength of DMRs, particularly since defendants are held strictly liable for NPDES violations. 33 Dischargers
have tried several defenses with very limited success, 34 although they
have sometimes been able to survive a motion for summary judgment
by plaintiffs. 35 Most of the cases are settled after a determination of
liability, with the parties finalizing the remedy in a consent decree. 36
The Supreme Court has noted that, in an enforcement action under
section 505 of the Clean Water Act, "the interest of the citizen-plaintiff is primarily forward-looking. " 37 Thus, the primary remedy available to private plaintiffs is an injunction requiring a discharger to
comply with the Clean Water Act, or if the citizen is suing the EPA,
an order directing the administrator to perform a nondiscretionary
duty. 38 In addition, unlike most environmental statutes, the Clean Water Act authorizes the imposition of civil penalties in citizen enforcement actions. 39 If ordered by a court, these penalties must be paid to
the United States Treasury; however, in past cases in which the parties
have settled, penalties have often gone to environmental projects or
organizations rather than to the Treasury. 40

30. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.21(!), (g), 122.44(i) (1987).
31. 33 u.s.c. § 1318(b) (1982).
32. DMRs may be used as admissions to establish the discharger's civil liability. Student
Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479, 1485
(D.N.J. 1985). See also, Thomas, Citizen Suits and the NPDES Program: A Review of Clean
Water Act Decisions, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10050, 10051-52 (1987).
33. Thomas, supra note 32.
34. Id. at 10052-55.
35. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620, 630-33
(D. Md. 1987).
36. The Clean Water Act Amendments of 1987, supra note 3, at 59.
31. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 382.
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982).
39. Id.
40. Lewis, Environmentalists' Authority To Sue Industry For Civil Penalties ls Unconstitutional Under the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10101, 10102
(1986). The 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act contained a provision requiring citizens to
submit proposed consent decrees to the EPA and the Department of Justice at least 45 days
before judicial approval. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(c)(3) (West Supp. 1988).
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Clean Water Act Citizen Suits in Perspective

Prior to 1982, private parties rarely filed enforcement actions under
the Clean Water Act, or under any other federal environmental statute. In the past five years, however, Clean Water Act citizen suits
have increased tremendously. 41 By 1985, citizen actions under section
505 had become a major, perhaps the major, source of enforcement
of the Clean Water Act at the federal level, 42 while private enforcement of the other federal environmental laws remained infrequent. 43

1.

The Role of Citizen Suits in Clean Water Act Enforcement

Commentators have noted that Congress authorized citizen suits to
enforce federal environmental statutes for two reasons. First, citizen
suits were seen as a way to promote government enforcement by prodding agency officials into action. 44 Second, citizen suits were viewed as
an auxiliary source of enforcement in cases of government inaction. 45
Thus, Congress gave private parties an important, but secondary, role
in enforcing the Clean Water Act. As the Supreme Court stated in
Gwaltney:
[T]he citizen suit is meant to supplement rather than to supplant
governmental action. The legislative history of the Act reinforces this
view of the role of the citizen suit. The Senate Report noted that
"[t]he Committee intends the great volume of enforcement actions
[to] be brought by the State," and that citizen suits are proper only
"if the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their
enforcement responsibility. " 46

For the first few years after its enactment in 1972, the citizen suit
provision of the Clean Water Act was little used. 47 Beginning in 1982,
however, environmental plaintiffs became much more active in using

41. See The Clean Water Act Amendments of 1987, supra note 3, at 51; Fadil, supra note
26, at 29-35.
42. See Miller, supra note 24, at 10313-14.
43. See Boyer & Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 833, 868-70
(1985).
44. ld. at 845-47; Miller, supra note 24, at 10310-11.
45. Miller, supra note 24, at 10311; Comment, Private Enforcement of the Clean Air Act
and the Clean Water Act, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 127, 136 (1985).
46. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 383.
47. See Fadil, supra note 26, at 35-36.
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section 505 for enforcement. 48 Citizens filed 16 notices of intent to sue
under section 505 in 1982, 99 notices in 1983, 172 notices in 1984, 107
notices in 1985, and 198 notices in 1986. 49 The upswing in citizen suits
coincided with a decline in the EPA's enforcement activity in the early
years of the Reagan Administration, 50 and the drop in government enforcement is generally viewed as the major cause for the growth of
section 505 actions. 51 Thus, in the 1980s citizen suits have emerged as
a major source of enforcement of the Clean Water Act. Former EPA
enforcement chief Jeffrey Miller writes, "[i]ndeed, it appears that
during the present dearth of government enforcement, private enforcement of traditional environmental laws is more frequent than
EPA enforcement. " 52
Although citizen suits have become a successful tool for Clean Water Act enforcement, private actions under the Act may only be
brought under section 505. 53 In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority
v. National Sea Clammers Association, 54 the Supreme Court held that
a private right of action for damages does not exist under the Clean
Water Act. 55 In the same case, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. section
1983 does not authorize private suits for violations of the Clean Water
Act by state officials. 56 The rationale for that holding also seems to
preclude Clean Water Act suits under the general federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1331. 57 Shortly before National
Sea Clammers, the Court held that the Clean Water Act has completely pre-empted the federal common law of nuisance in the field of
water pollution. 58 The Supreme Court also has held that the Clean

48. The origins of the rapid increase in litigation under section 505 are discussed in Miller,
Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, (pt. 3), 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10407, 10424 (1984), which credits the Natural Resources Defense Council with starting the
trend, and Fadil, supra note 26, at 36, which emphasizes the role of Anthony z. Reisman, of
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice in promoting litigation strategies to prosecute NPDES permit
violators.
49. The Clean Water Act Amendments of 1987, supra note 3, at 51.
50. See Feller, Private Enforcement of Federal Anti-Pollution Laws through Citizen Suits:
A Model, 60 DEN. L.J. 553,554 (1983).
51. See, e.J!., Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 43, at 870-80; Miller, supra note 48, at 10424.
52. Miller, supra note 24, at 10313.
53. Citizen plaintiffs seeking remedies other than those provided in section 505 have relied
on the savings clause of section 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1982). That clause reads, "[n)othing in
this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any
other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency).''
54. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
55. Jd. at 17-18.
56. ld. at 19-21.
57. Miller, supra note 24, at 10322-23.
58. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,317 (1981).
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Water Act precludes nuisance suits for interstate water pollution, except suits brought under the law of the state in which the pollution
source 1s located. 59 Thus, section 505 and the law of the "source
state" provide the only remedies for citizens harmed by water pollution.

2. Section 505 Enforcement Compared with Citizen Enforcement
of Other Federal Environmental Laws
The first major federal environmental legislation to contain a citizen suit provision was the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. 60 Since
then, citizen suit provisions have become a standard feature of federal
environmental laws. 61 The original Clean Air Act provision became
the model which has been used, with slight changes, by every one of
these statutes. 62 Thus, in most respects, section 505 is identical to the
other environmental citizen suit provisions. However, only in the case
of the Clean Water Act have private parties used their statutory authority to assume a major role in enforcement. 63
Several commentators have tried to explain why section 505 suits
are numerous, while citizen suits under the other statutes are scarce. 64
Two factors seem most important. First, Clean Water Act violations
are relatively easy to prove. The citizen plaintiff often may establish a
violation simply by introducing DMRs which show that a polluter's
discharges have exceeded permitted levels. 65 Problems of proof appear
greater under other environmental statutes. 66 Second, section 505 is
one of the few citizen suit provisions which authorizes the court to
award civil penalties against violators. Other than the Clean Water

59. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805, 812-13 (1987).
60. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 12(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1706-07 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7604
(1982)).
61. No less than 13 federal environmental laws specifically authorize citizen suits. In addition to the Clean Water Act, these provisions are found in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604
(1982); Cpmprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9659 (West Supp. 1987); Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1982); Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1982); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305(a)
(1982); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1415(g) (West 1986);
Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1982); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §
1349 (1982); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972 (West Supp. 1987);
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1982); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982).
62. See Miller, supra note 24, at 10311-13.
63. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 43, at 868-70.
64. See, e.g., Fadil, supra note 26, at 35-74; Comment, supra note 45, at 155-72.
65. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 45, at 159-66 (which discusses the differences between
the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act regarding problems of prooO.
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Act, only two federal environmental statutes allow for civil penalties
in citizen suits. 67
In sum, while considerable potential exists for private enforcement
of federal environmental laws, Clean Water Act citizen suits are the
only real success story. Citizen enforcement under section 505 has
worked because plaintiffs can prove violations simply and efficiently,
and because courts can impose civil penalties for those violations. The
Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney may change both of these elements and reduce the effectiveness of private enforcement of the
Clean Water Act.
II.

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF Gwaltney on Private Enforcement

The Supreme Court held in Gwaltney that citizens must make a
"good-faith allegation of continuous or intermittent violation" to
bring suit under section 505 of the Clean Water Act. 68 The Court thus
resolved a split in the circuits over the ability of citizen plaintiffs to
bring suits purely for past violations of the Clean Water Act. 69 However, the Gwaltney decision may have raised more questions than it
answered, largely due to a paragraph in the opinion dealing with
mootness.

A.

Gwaltney: Simple Holding, Puzzling Dictum

The Gwaltney litigation arose due to NPDES permit violations at
Gwaltney's meatpacking plant in Virginia. 70 The Supreme Court noted
that more than 150 violations occurred from 1981 to 1984. 71 Two environmental groups sent notice of intent to sue in February 1984, and
filed an action in June of that year. 72 They asked the distri'ct court to
provide declaratory and injunctive relief, impose civil penalties, and

67. These statutes, and their citizen suit provisions, are the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972 (West Supp. 1987), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659 (West Supp.
1987).
68. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 385.
69. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th
Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987) (holding that allegations of past violations are sufficient for citizen suits). See also Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th
Cir. 1985) (requiring allegations of an ongoing violation at the time suit is filed); Pawtuxet Cove
Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 484
(1987) (determining that an allegation of "continuing likelihood" of a violation is required for a
citizen suit).
70. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 379.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 379-80.
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award attorney fees and costs. 73 The district court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that Gwaltney had violated
and was in violation of the Clean Water Act. 74 Before the district
court decided upon a remedy, however, Gwaltney filed a motion to
dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 75 Gwaltney
argued that section 505 only confers jurisdiction over citizen suits if
the defendant is in violation of the Clean Water Act at the time the
suit is filed. 76 The trial court rejected this argument, reading section
505 as authorizing citizen suits for past violations of the Clean Water
Act even if there is no ongoing violation. 77 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, and upheld the district court's award of nearly $1.3 million in
civil penalties. 78
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that citizen plaintiffs must
make a "good-faith allegation of continuous or intermittent" ongoing
violation to bring a section 505 suit. 79 The Court focused first on the
language of section 505 which allows citizens to sue "any person ...
who is alleged to be in violation" of certain portions of the Clean
Water Act. 80 The Court also focused on other portions of section 505
and its legislative history, concluding that ''the interest of the citizenplaintiff is primarily forward-looking" 81 in that Congress viewed citizen suits chiefly as abatement actions. 82 The Court remanded the case
for a determination of whether the complaint contained a good-faith
allegation of an ongoing violation. 83

73. Id.
74. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1544
(E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
75. Id.
76. The most recent DMRs available at the time of filing showed that Gwaltney was in
violation of its permit, although it would later appear that the last actual recorded violation was
in May 1984. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 380.
77. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1547-51.
78. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.
1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
79. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 385.
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(l) (1982).
81. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 382.
82. Id. at 383.
83. Justice Marshall delivered the Court's opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Brennan, White and Blackmun. Justice Scalia, along with Justices Stevens and O'Connor, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Scalia criticized the majority's holding that a
good-faith allegation of an ongoing violation is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over section 505
actions. The proper jurisdictional inquiry, according to the concurring justices, is whether the
defendant was actually in violation at the time of filing-"whether [defendant) had taken remedial steps that had clearly achieved the effect of curing all past violations by the time suit was
brought." Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 388. (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia argued that the majority
had "create[d) a peculiar new form of subject matter jurisdiction" by holding that, "in order to
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The most troubling part of the Court's opinion is its last substantive
paragraph, and the accompanying footnote, which discuss mootness.
[Gwaltney] also worries that our construction of § 505 would permit
citizen-plaintiffs, if their allegations of ongoing noncompliance
become false at some later point in the litigation because the
defendant begins to comply with the Act, to continue nonetheless to
press their suit to conclusion. According to petitioner, such a result
would contravene both the prospective purpose of the citizen suit
provisions and the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III.
Longstanding principles of mootness, however, prevent the
maintenance of suit when "there is no reasonable expectation that
the wrong will be repeated." In seeking to have a case dismissed as
moot, however, the defendant's burden "is a heavy one." The
defendant must demonstrate that it is "absolutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
recur.'' Mootness doctrine thus protects defendants from the
maintenance of suit under the Clean Air Act [sic] based solely on
violations wholly unconnected to any present or future wrong doing,
while it also protects plaintiffs from defendants who seek to evade
sanction by predictable "protestations of repentance and reform." 84
Under the Act, plaintiffs are also protected from the suddenly
repentant defendant by the authority of the District Courts to award
litigation costs "whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate.'' The legislative history of this provision states explicitly
that the award of costs "should extend to plaintiffs in actions which
result in successful abatement but do not reach a verdict. For
instance, if as a result of a citizen proceeding and before a verdict is
issued, a defendant abated a violation, the court may award
litigation expenses borne by the plaintiffs in prosecuting such
actions. " 85

The ambiguity of this language raises substantial questions about the
circumstances in which a citizen suit could be dismissed as moot. The
Court's intentions are hard to fathom, particularly since neither of the
parties to the action argued mootness or briefed the issue. 86

carry a lawsuit to judgment, allegations are necessary but proof of those allegations (if they are
contested) is not." Id. at 386-87. However, Scalia's charge that the jurisdictional allegations
need never be proved under the majority's holding seems to be contradicted by the majority
opinion's language that the allegations must be proved at trial if plaintiff is to prevail. Id. at 386.
84. Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 386 n.6 (citations omitted).
86. The United States' amicus brief did contain a short discussion of mootness, but concluded that the case was not moot. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Affirmance at 27-29. This amicus brief greatly influenced the court in Gwaltney: unlike the parties to the case, the United States argued that a good-faith allegation of an ongoing violation was
necessary and sufficient for jurisdiction over section 505 suits, and the Court essentially adopted
the government's position.
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Most likely, the interpretation of the mootness dictum in Gwaltney
now will be a major issue in Clean Water Act citizen suits. At least
one section 505 defendant has filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment on the Grounds of Mootness and Lack of a Case or Controversy. " 87 Other defendants, who have been found to have violated the
Clean Water Act and were on the verge of settling with citizen plaintiffs, have balked at signing consent decrees. 88 Apparently, all bets are
off until Gwaltney is clarified.
A spate of post-Gwaltney litigation is inevitable. The way in which
courts apply mootness principles in section 505 actions is sure to have
a major impact on citizen enforcement of the Act. The following discussion suggests that courts making mootness determinations must
recognize the role of citizen plaintiffs as private attorneys general in
the Clean Water Act enforcement scheme.

B.

Mootness in Clean Water Act Citizen Suits

The Supreme Court's final words in Gwaltney indicate that "longstanding principles of mootness" apply in section 505 actions. 89 Two
such principles were mentioned by the Court. First, that suits may not
be maintained where there is "no reasonable expectation that the
wrong will be repeated," and second, that defendants face a heavy
burden in seeking to have cases dismissed as moot.9° The Court impliedly underscored the second point by way of the first with its choice
of emphasis in the following sentence: "The defendant must demonstrate that it is absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior
could not reasonably be expected to recur.' ' 91
Thus, the Court has clearly placed the onus on citizen suit defendants to show that mootness principles require dismissal. Application
of these principles in section 505 actions should lead courts to adopt
one of three positions in determining whether to assess civil penalties
if there is no ongoing violation anytime prior to final judgment.

1. Position One: The Case is Moot in the Absence of Ongoing
Violations at the Time of Final Judgment
Under this view, the case must be dismissed if the defendant comes
into compliance with the Clean Water Act at any time before final

87. At the time of this writing, the defendant's motion had been denied. Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., No. 83-2040 (D.N.J. Mar. 30,
1988) (opinion and order imposing civil penalties and granting injunctive relieO.
88. Interview with Douglas A. Cohen, U.S. Department of Justice, Land and Natural Resources Division (Dec. 11, 1987).
89. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. 386.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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judgment. This argument already has been advanced by a defendant
in one section 505 case. 92
Position One is legally untenable. One of the "longstanding principles of mootness" is that voluntary discontinuance of the allegedly
illegal practices does not make a case moot. 93 Abandonment of the
activity is a factor for the court to consider, ''but that is a matter
relating to the exercise rather than the existence of judicial power" to
hear the case. 94 Thus, a defendant's showing of present compliance
does not dispose of the matter. Instead, it serves as evidence on the
issue of whether it is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.' ' 95
Position One is also bad policy, at least if one accepts two basic
assumptions. The first assumption is that in many, if not most, cases
defendants will be able to get the action dismissed and avoid sanctions
by achieving compliance after the filing of the action but before final
judgment. 96 This result would create two sets of bad incentives. Prior
to litigation, defendants would have little incentive to come into compliance, since they probably would not be penalized for their past violations and therefore would lose nothing by waiting to be sued by
citizens. 97 Once litigation commenced, time would be on the defendant's side, and every delay would work to the defendant's advantage. 98 On the other hand, a citizen plaintiff interested in seeing the
defendant pay civil penalties would be inclined to push for quick judicial resolution of the case, rather than participating in settlement negotiations. A a less constructive scenario is hard to imagine.
Some have argued that citizen plaintiffs should forget about exacting civil penalties, 99 since the penalties do not directly benefit the citi-

92. Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., No. 832040 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 1988).
93. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953).
94. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982).
95. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386.
96. These cases may be a long time in reaching final judgment. For example, the Monsanto
case was filed in May 1983, and the judge found the Monsanto company to be in violation of the
Act and granted partial summary judgment to plaintiffs in December 1983, but the the trial on
civil penalties and injunctive relief was not held until March, 1988.
97. This theory assumes that the government, which has the authority to bring suit for
wholly past violations, does not take enforcement actions of its own or intervene in the citizen
suit. The government's enforcement resources are limited, and therefore it might not become
involved in a suit for past penalties only. This does not necessarily reflect bad faith, or even bad
judgment, by the government. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
98. Attorney fees (both defendant's and plaintiff's) would accumulate, but paying lawyers
may be cheaper than complying with the Clean Water Act or paying civil penalties.
99. See Garrett, Citizen Suits: A Defense Perspective, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10162, 10163 (1986).
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zen, 100 and should instead concentrate on forcing statutory
compliance. However, this argument runs counter to the second assumption which is that penalties promote "voluntary" compliance by
deterring violations.
The legislative history of the Clean Water Act confirms the notion
that Congress believed stiff civil penalties were needed to "encourage
compliance" with the Clean Water Act. "[T]he threat of sanction
must be real, and enforcement provisions must be swift and direct.
Abatement orders, penalty provisions, and rapid access to the Federal
District Court should accomplish the objective of compliance." 101 If
no meaningful threat of sanction exists, wi then dischargers' most
profitable course will be to wait until they are sued to abate their violations.i03 A regulatory scheme which must rely on constant litigation
to force compliance is fundamentally flawed.
If sanctions are necessary, one might argue, why not let the government play a greater role in Clean Water Act enforcement? The EPA's
authority to bring suits purely for past violations of the Clean Water
Act is "little questioned." 104 The EPA could even intervene in citizen
suits and preserve the court's ability to assess civil penalties for past
violations. However, as a practical matter the EPA cannot, and
should not, greatly expand its enforcement role under the Clean Water Act. More EPA enforcement is impractical because the agency's
enforcement resources are scarce, and it is unwise because those resources could be better spent elsewhere. ios For example, hazardous
waste enforcement cases are the kind which should be brought by the
government; they are big and complex, requiring a high degree of
technical expertise. Litigation may involve many parties and drag on
for years, costing millions of dollars. These are not good cases for
private enforcement. Clean Water Act enforcement actions, on the
other hand, are well suited to citizen enforcement. They are relatively
simple cases which can be proved by readily available information,

100. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
101. s. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1971) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
102. Again, this assumes that government enforcement is unlikely. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
103. See Roisman, The Role of the Citizen in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 16 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10163 (1986).
104. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 382. However, the defendant in one government enforcement
action under the Clean Water Act argues that the EPA has no statutory authority to seek penalties for purely past violations, and seeks to discount the Court's language in Gwaltney as dictum.
Defendant's Reply Brief to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 4-9,
United States v. Holly Farms of Texas, Inc., No. Civ-L-87-119-CA (E.D. Tex. filed Dec. 14,
1987).
105. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 43, at 906-07; Comment, supra note 45, at 129-30.
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often allowing for resolution on partial summary judgment. 106 They
usually involve only one defendant, and they require much less technical expertise than many kinds of environmental cases. 101 Thus, the
emergence of private citizens as the key enforcers of the Clean Water
Act does not necessarily reflect a failure by the EPA, or a breakdown
in the way federal environmental laws should be enforced. On the
contrary, it is an efficient allocation of public and private enforcement resources. 108
Thus, it would appear that Position One should not be adopted by
the courts because it is incompatible with mootness principles and is
also poor policy because it will decrease the deterrence provided by
citizen suits by making penalties harder to impose.

2. Position Two: A Case is Moot if the Defendant Can Show That
Violations Cannot Reasonably Be Expected to Recur
The language in Gwaltney is too ambiguous to provide a clear picture of the circumstances in which the Court would find a citizen suit
to be moot. However, as the Court stated in Gwaltney, "to acknowledge ambiguity is not to conclude that all interpretations are equally
plausible." 109 In this case the most plausible reading of the Court's
language is that a citizen suit will be considered moot, even though the
complaint contained a good-faith allegation of an ongoing violation,
if prior to final judgment defendant can show that it is "absolutely
clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.'' 110
Two points of the Court's opinion provide the primary support for
this interpretation. First, the mootness paragraph speaks to the conditions under which an action may be maintained. 111 Second, Part II of
the opinion stresses the primarily prospective na:ture of citizen suits

106. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
107. See Comment, supra note 45, at 159-60.
108. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 43, at 879.
109. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381.
110. Id. at 386.
111. "Mootness doctrine thus protects defendants from the maintenance of suit under the
Clean Air [sic] Act based solely on violations wholly unconnected to any present or future
wrongdoing, while it also protects plaintiffs from defendants who seek to evade sanction by
predictable 'protestations of repentance and reform."' Id. (citation omitted). The Court went on
to say in a footnote, "(u]nder the Act, plaintiffs are also protected from the suddenly repentant
defendant by the authority of the District Courts to award litigation costs 'whenever the court
determines such award is appropriate.'" Id. at 386 n.6 (citation omitted). Because the Court said
plaintiffs are also protected, this footnote should not be read to require dismissal wherever there
is a suddenly repentant defendant.
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and the link between section 505 civil penalties and injunctive relief. 112
Nonetheless, one should not conclude that Gwaltney has firmly ensconced Position Two as the mootness rule to be applied to citizen
suits. First, the opinion's mootness language is ambiguous enough to
allow for more than one plausible interpretation. Second, while Supreme Court pronouncements must carry great weight, the mootness
discussion in Gwaltney was limited to a one-paragraph dictum. Third,
because mootness was not an issue in Gwaltney, neither party addressed the issue in briefs. 113 Finally, the policy implications of Position Two are very troubling. In its summary treatment of mootness,
the Court may have failed to consider some very important issues.
Given the ambiguity of the Court's position, other courts should consider these issues in applying mootness principles in Clean Water Act
citizen suits.
The most disturbing implications of Position Two are its potential
impacts on litigation. First, citizen suits would become much more
complicated. Until Gwaltney, courts generally focused simply on
whether the defendant's DMRs showed violations; if so, the court
granted partial summary judgment to plaintiffs on that issue, and the
parties usually settled the remedy portion of the case. 114 Under Position Two, however, the central issue of the case would be whether
there is a reasonable chance that the defend ant ·will violate the Clean
Water Act in the future. This would be a hotly contested issue of fact,
one which probably would result in increasingly complex litigation requiring considerable expert testimony. Citizen suits no longer would
be simple and straightforward.
Second, Position Two would encourage litigation on the mootness
issue. A short term flood of post-Gwaltney litigation seems inevitable.
However, if courts espouse an ad hoc mootness standard such as Position Two, as opposed to a bright line rule, such as Position One or
Three, the result will be great uncertainty as to when a citizen suit is
moot. For example, is a case moot when a discharger installs state of
the art pollution control technology? When it modifies the production
process that caused the violation? When it voluntarily ceases the process for economic reasons? When it reroutes its discharges to a different treatment plant? When it shuts down its facility altogether? Does
a new NPDES permit, issued after the suit is filed, moot an action for
violations of the former permit? Is an action moot if the discharging
facility changes ownership during the litigation? If a discharger is in

112.
113.
114.

Id. at 382.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
The Clean Water Act Amendments of 1987, supra note 3, at 57-59.
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violation of a number of parameters of his permit at the time the suit
is filed, but has complied with all but one parameter before final judgment, is the action moot in regard to violations of the other parameters? These are just a few of the issues which probably would be
litigated before the definition of "mootness" under Position Two became clear.
Third, under Position Two, time would work in favor of defendants and give them incentives to delay pending litigation in order to
achieve compliance. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, would want to push
the litigation forward and not spend time discussing settlement. 115 Litigation within this framework would undoubtedly be bitter. Thus, Position Two would tend to make litigation more adversarial, more
frequent, and more complicated.
Position Two also is troubling because it may reduce the deterrent
effect of private enforcement. Citizens may be less likely to file suit if
they expect the litigation to be lengthy, contentious, and difficult because of the mootness issue. In addition, dischargers' compliance incentives will be low if they believe that civil penalties are not likely to
be imposed under Position Two, 116 and as discussed above, providing
deterrence through increased government enforcement is both impractical and imprudent. 111
Position Two ultimately may not greatly reduce deterrence if courts
require defendants to make a strong showing that they will not violate
the Clean Water Act in the future. The Court's language in Gwaltney
certainly supports a high threshold for mootness. 118 If the courts make
it clear that citizen suits will not be dismissed as moot unless future
violations definitely cannot occur, then Position Two's negative impact on deterrence and its tendency to encourage litigation on the
mootness issue will be minimized.
Finally, Position Two may result in considerable unfairness to some
defendants. If a defendant's liability for civil penalties for past violations turns upon the likelihood that the defendant will violate the
Clean Water Act in the future, then dischargers with similar records
of past violations may be treated quite differently. Indeed, a defendant with a heinous record of blatant disregard for permit limitations

115. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes I 04-08 and accompanying text.
118. "In seeking to have a case dismissed as moot, however, the defendant's burden 'is a
heavy one.' The defendant must demonstrate that it is 'absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur."' Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386 (citations
omitted).
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may not be penalized at all, 119 while another defend ant with a much
better record may face stiff statutory penalties. 120 One might argue
that this is not a bad result. Since civil penalties are designed to ensure
compliance, a defendant who is able to prove future compliance
should not be held liable. However, there is certainly a punitive element to Clean Water Act civil penalties, as the Court recognized in a
recent case. 121 Moreover, Congress realized that punitive sanctions are
necessary to encourage voluntary compliance when it authorized civil
penalties. 122 Clean Water Act enforcement will lose much of its deterrent effect, not to mention its fairness and legitimacy, if some defend ants are made to pay for proven past violations and others are not.
In sum, Position Two would encourage litigation on the mootness
issue and make each case more complicated. In addition, thi~position
would tend to reduce the deterrent effect of citizen suits and the fairness of Clean Water Act enforcement. If courts heed the language of
Gwaltney and place a heavy burden on defendants who seek to prove
mootness, these negative effects can be mitigated. However, these impacts can be avoided altogether; they do not follow inevitably from
the application of "longstanding principles of mootness" in section
505 actions. A different result is entirely consistent with mootness
principles and with citizens' enforcement authority under the Clean
Water Act.

3. Position Three: A Citizen May Maintain a Suit for Civil
Penalties After Proving a Good-faith Allegation of an Ongoing
Violation at the Time the Suit was Filed
Position Three would allow a court to assess civil penalties for
Clean Water Act violations even if there is no possibility of future
violations, once the court determines that the plaintiff made a goodfaith allegation of an ongoing violation at the time the suit was filed.
This rule is based on a key principle of mootness, and on citizens'
statutory role as private attorneys general in enforcing the Clean Water Act.

119. However, deliberate violations by the defendant in the past would be strong evidence of
the likelihood of future violations. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974); United
States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1952).
120. This effect is not unique to Position Two; the holding in Gwaltney preventing citizens
from suing for wholly past violations of the Clean Water Act makes some disparate treatment of
past violations inevitable. However, Position Two would create the greatest uncertainty, since
liability for proven violations would depend largely upon the likelihood of violations in the future. Government intervention in citizen suits could reduce unfairness, since the EPA can sue for
purely past violations.
121. Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831, 1838-39 (1987).
122. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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When a plaintiff seeks monetary or declaratory relief in addition to
an injunction, the injunction claim may become moot but the rest of
the suit survives. 123 "Claims for damages or other monetary relief automatically avoid mootness, so long as the claim remains viable." 124
Courts have applied this principle in government actions to enforce
the Clean Water Act; the possibility of civil penalties keeps the suit
alive, despite the mootness of the claim for injunctive relief. 125 Thus,
the whole mootness issue turns on whether the Clean Water Act gives
citizen plaintiffs the authority to maintain suits for civil penalties once
their claims for injunctive relief become moot.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Clean Water Act
authorizes citizens to enforce the Act as private attorneys general. 126
Thus, Congress "deputized" private citizens to enforce public rights
created by statute . 127 "It should be stressed that the citizen suit authorization [of section 505] allows the citizen to vindicate a public
right. " 128 The legislative history of section 505 and its provision allowing recovery of attorney fees reflect Congress' belief that citizen plaintiffs "would be performing a public service." 129 Although section 505
defines "citizen" for the purpose of standing as "a person having an
interest which is or may be adversely affected, " 13° Congress clearly
intended a citizen to be able to enforce the public interest, 131 and the
Supreme Court has recognized this intention. 132

123. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. Mccorkle,
416 U.S. 115 (1974); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. I (1978).
124. 13A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3533.3 (1984) (emphasis added).
125. See, e.g., United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1980)
(where the district court determined liability and retained jurisdiction to ascertain civil penalties,
the appeal was not moot even though defendants complied with an EPA order by installing
pollution control equipment). See generally Government of the Virgin Islands, Dep't. of Conserv. and Cul. Aff's v. Virgin Islands Paving, Inc., 714 F.2d 283, 284 (3d Cir. 1983).
126. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I, 16-17
(1981).
127. See generally Public Interest Bounty Hunters v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 548 F. Supp. 157, 161 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
128. I F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW§ 3.03[10l[b] (1987). See also RODGERS,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §J.13 (1977).
129. SENATE REPORT, supra note JOI, at 81.
130. 33 u.s.c. § 1365(g) (1982).
131. Consider the following colloquy on the Senate floor between Senator Muskie, one of
the principal authors of the Clean Water Act, and Senator Bayh on the standing provision which
emerged from the Conference Committee:
Mr. Muskie: Thus it is clear that under the language agreed to by the conference, a
noneconomic interest in the environment, in clean water, is a sufficient base for a
citizen suit under section 505.
Further, every citizen of the United States has a legitimate and established interest
in the use and quality of the navigable waters of the United States ....
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Moreover, section 505 strengthens citizens' ability to enforce the
Clean Water Act by authorizing the court to award civil penalties,
payable to the United States Treasury, in private enforcement actions.133 The importance of this provision must not be underestimated.
By approving civil penalties in citizen suits, Congress gave private enforcers the power to vindicate public rights by seeking sanctions
against violators. These sanctions do not directly benefit the plaintiffs. Citizens' authority to pursue penalties for public benefit confirms their role as enforcers of public rights. Because citizen plaintiffs,
under section 505, are private attorneys general enforcing public statutory rights, their claims for civil penalties must survive even if their
claims for injunctive relief become moot.
None of this is contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Gwaltney. The Court held that citizens may not bring suit under section 505
without a "good-faith allegation of continuous or intermittent violation. " 134 However, the Court did not state that a suit for penalties
could not survive without an ongoing violation once this jurisdictional
hurdle had been cleared. The Court noted that ''the interest of the
citizen-plaintiff is primarily forward-looking." 135 Since citizens may
only seek civil penalties if they request an injunction and allege ongoing violations at the time of filing, their interests remain primarily forward-looking. The Court also stated that ''the citizen suit is meant to
supplement rather that to supplant governmental action." 136 However,
in those situations where the government, for whatever reason, takes
no action, citizens would be able to more effectively enforce the Clean
Water Act. 137
Nor would Position Three "create a peculiar new form of subject
matter jurisdiction" under which the jurisdictional allegations need
Mr. Bayh: I believe that the conference provision will not prevent any person or
group with a legitimate concern about water quality from bringing suit against those
who violate the act or a permit, or against the Administrator if he fails to perform a
nondiscretionary act.
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 221
(1973) [hereinafter LEGISLAITVE HISTORY].
132. "This broad category of potential plaintiffs necessarily includes ... plaintiffs seeking
to enforce these statutes as private attorneys general, whose injuries are "noneconomic" and
probably noncompensable." Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. I, 16-17 (1981).
133. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982).
134. Gwaltney, 1011 S. Ct. at 385.
135. Id. at 382.
136. Id. at 383.
137. The Clean Water Act's legislative history supports this view. "It should be noted that if
the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility, the public
is provided the right to seek vigorous enforcement action under the citizen suit provisions of
section 505." SENATE REPORT, supra note IOI, at 64.
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never be proved, as the concurring justices in Gwaltney believed the
majority opinion would do. 138 The majority opinion clearly states that
the defendant may challenge the jurisdictional allegations before trial,
and if that challenge is unsuccessful, "the case proceeds to trial on the
merits, where the plaintiff must prove the allegations in order to prevail." ' 39 This language indicates that citizen plaintiffs must eventually
prove the defendant was actually in violation of the Clean Water Act
at the time the suit was filed. However, as the concurring opinion indicates, this showing may be very similar to the jurisdictional showing
that the allegations of an ongoing violation were made in good faith.
The phrase in § 505(a), "to be in violation," unlike the phrase "to
be violating" or "to have committed a violation," suggests a state
rather than an act-the opposite of a state of compliance. A good or
lucky day is not a state of compliance. Nor is the dubious state in
which a past effluent problem is not recurring at the moment but the
cause of that problem has not been completely and clearly
eradicated. When a company has violated an effluent standard or
limitation, it remains, for purposes of § 505(a), "in violation" of
that standard or limitation so long as it has not put in place remedial
measures that clearly eliminate the cause of the violation. It does not
suffice to defeat subject matter jurisdiction that the success of the
attempted remedies becomes clear months or even weeks after the
suit is filed. 140

Thus, a citizen plaintiff must make a good-faith allegation of an ongoing violation in order to bring suit under section 505, and must support those allegations with evidence if they are challenged. At trial,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant violated the Clean Water
Act and had not "taken remedial steps that had clearly achieved the
effect of curing all past violations by the time suit was brought. " 141 If
the plaintiff can prove these points, the court should be able to assess
penalties for any proven violations regardless of events occurring subsequent to the filing of the action.
The role of citizens as enforcers of public rights under the Clean
Water Act has raised constitutional questions. A detailed analysis of
the constitutionality of section 505 is beyond the scope of this work.
However, these arguments, as well as the early judicial response to
them, warrant a brief discussion.

138.
139.
140.
141.

Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386.
Id. at 387 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 388.
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The first argument against citizens' authority to seek civil penalties
is based on principles of standing and the Article III case or controversy requirement. The crux of this position is that Congress acted
unconstitutionally by failing to connect the power to seek penalties to
the fact of injury and by granting citizens power to protect more than
their own interest. 142 Section 505 allows citizens to protect public
rights even if the plaintiffs' personal injuries are noncompensable, as
the Supreme Court has recognized. 143 However, courts have rejected
the constitutional challenge and upheld section 505.
While every lawsuit which receives judicial review on the merits must
fall within the scope of Article III of the Constitution, it is a matter
of black letter law that Article III does not limit congressional power
to define categories of individuals as parties sufficiently aggrieved by
a particular governmental action to warrant a statutory right to
sue. 144

The second constitutional argument is based on the principles of
nondelegation and the separation of powers. 145 In essence, the argument is that Congress may not grant the power to enforce federal laws
to persons outside of the Executive Branch. 146 So far, no court has
accepted this position either. "Statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress, and it is entirely appropriate for Congress, in
creating these rights and obligations, to determine in addition who
may enforce them and in what manner." 147
Congress has given citizens the power to vindicate public rights as
private attorneys general under the Clean Water Act, including the
power to seek civil penalties payable to the Treasury. Because citizens
may enforce public rights and pursue statutory sanctions for public
benefit, their claims for civil penalties should survive even when their
claims for injunctive relief become moot. Position Three would allow
citizens to remain effective as the final enforcers of public rights under the Clean Water Act.

142. Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F.
Supp. 1474, 1478 (D.N.J. 1985).
143. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I, 16-18
(1981). See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 131 and accompanying text.
144. RITE-Research Improves the Env't, Inc. v. Costle, 650 F.2d 1312, 1320 (5th Cir.
1981). See also Monsanto, 600 F. Supp. at 1478-79.
145. See Lewis, supra note 40.
146. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620, 623 (D.
Md. 1987).
147. Id. at 625, quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979). See also Monsanto, 600
F. Supp. at 1478-79.
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CONCLUSION

Citizen suits have become a vital source of Clean Water Act enforcement. Section 505 actions have been attractive to private plaintiffs because of the relative ease with which violations may be proved
and the authority of courts to award civil penalties. As a result, the
Clean Water Act is the only major federal environmental law in which
citizen enforcement has fulfilled its potential.
As today's tight government budgets and new environmental initiatives force public enforcement officials to do more with less, private
enforcement must play a major role in ensuring compliance with the
environmental laws. The Supreme Court's holding in Gwaltney, and
its dictum on mootness, are certain to provoke much litigation on the
ability of citizens to bring and maintain enforcement actions under
section 505. Until the courts begin to decide the issues presented in
these cases, the impacts of Gwaltney will remain uncertain.

